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Business can be likened to an institution of archetypal stature, influencing not only how work 
organisations are managed but also what society values both socio-economically and 
morally. As such, it also carries a significant shadow which pervades the psyche of individual 
agents. The significance of this collective shadow raises important moral questions usually 
discussed under the term ‘business ethics’; however, too little attention is given to the 
unconscious influences that underlie most moral conflicts in business and within the context 
of work organisations. Jung’s insights into the moral dimension of the psyche and the ethical 
value of individuation have much relevance to a better understanding of the various types of 
moral tension in business and at work. In particular, Jung’s comprehension of the inherent 
moral struggle between the individual and the collective is discussed, and its value for 
reviewing the state of ethics in business is explained.  
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Business is undeniably a shaping force in contemporary society. Business interests 
influence policies, organisational values, culture and structure, as well as the meaning and 
value of work. Business interests corrupt and divide as much as they free the 
‘entrepreneurial spirit’ that supposedly drives economic and social progress. Business, then, 
is an archetype with a dual face: it creates and destroys; it enables growth, but this comes at 
a cost, as is typical of the compensatory dynamic of the psyche (Jung, 1969b; Morgan, 
2000). Business is an institution which manifests itself in the form of individual organisations, 
themselves composed of individual agents. Business values run throughout, part of the 
collective psyche which mirrors and intertwines with the psyche of individuals. In this 
purview, business is worthy of closer scrutiny since its pervasiveness in society can greatly 
influence how individuals feel, think and behave. As Moore (1996) writes: ‘Business reaches 
so far into the concerns of the heart that perhaps we should investigate the soul of 
commerce and the state of the soul in the workplace’ (p. 125).  
 
Investigating the soul of commerce is a vast project, so I will here focus on the ethical 
dimensions and implications of business. From a dynamic perspective, we could say that 
what is ethically good is what nourishes the soul and enables its manifestation and 
development; likewise, what is ethically bad is what constrains the full expression of the soul 
or what deprives the soul from its necessary nutrients. Ethics is at the core of human life, 
and it is a most significant source of self-understanding. It has been noted before (Proulx, 
1994; Solomon, 2001) that Jung placed much emphasis on ethics in his work, arguing that 
moral conflicts can trigger psychological imbalances and physical ailments (see notably the 
examples given in the Tavistock lectures 1935/1977, including paras. 107-108). Equally, he 
suggested – though never so explicitly – that individuation is a moral task and that the 





Although Jung’s writings on ethics are scattered and often broad in scope, I argue that he 
has much to offer to enable better understanding of ethical issues in business, and to identify 
a hopeful way forward. The psyche’s dynamics are particularly valuable when analysing 
moral tensions within business organisations, and within the mind of individual agents. As 
we are left dismayed by the endless abuse of human dignity in the workplace, increasing 
wealth inequality, recurring financial scandals and abusive corporate lobbying, it is essential 
to examine the ethical nature of business and explore more systematically how business 
people (which here includes both managers and workers, as both have a vested interest in 
business and at least implicitly endorse business values) experience moral tension and deal 
with it. The analysis needs to be done concurrently at the collective and individual level, for 
the two interrelate, but the groundwork necessarily occurs within the psyche of each 
individual as it requires the conscious engagement of the ego in understanding the issues 
and making choices.  
 
To do such analysis effectively, we need to look beyond traditional moral theories, especially 
those inherited from the Enlightenment which place Reason above all else. Business indeed 
is also about the soul, and therefore needs to be apprehended more holistically. In his 
compelling essay The undiscovered self (1957/1970), Jung clearly outlined the ethical 
challenges of our modern epoch – and the same challenges remain today: 
It is not that present-day man is capable of greater evil than the man of antiquity or 
the primitive. He merely has incomparably more effective means with which to realize 
his propensity to evil. As his consciousness has broadened and differentiated, so his 
moral nature has lagged behind. That is the great problem before us today. Reason 
alone no longer suffices. (para. 574, original emphasis) 
Shaped by organisations, acculturated into a consumption-based and profit-driven society, 
present-day people – at least in the West – suffer from a moral malaise which suggests our 
ethical ‘toolbox’ has not kept up with the other advancements we have achieved, in 
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technology and beyond. In what follows, I will outline how and why Jung’s insights remain 
most significant some 60 years later to enable us to understand the ethical problems of 
‘present-day’ men and women whose lives are very much shaped by business. 
 
Setting the context: The place of business in society 
A few clarifications on the context ought to be made first. Business here encompasses all 
activities relating to trade and commerce, with the aim of generating a profit of some sort. It 
therefore includes the management of the entire supply chain, from activities necessary for 
the manufacturing of goods to those relating to the distribution of goods, stretching to the 
disposal and recycling of used goods. It also includes the financial transactions which 
underlie and relate to the production and distribution processes. Business is thus central to 
the sustenance of any economy, and it affects a vast range of people in many ways: capital 
owners, employers, employees, traders, investors, as well as customers or consumers. As 
business does not operate in a vacuum, it also matters to political leaders and elected 
bodies as well as citizens; to public servants who work with, compete with or regulate 
privately-owned businesses; and to activists who are usually concerned with the effects of 
business activities on the social or environmental sphere both locally and globally. In effect, 
business’ business is everybody’s business, for all of us are affected in one way or another 
by what business does.  
 
Its social impact is equally significant: what markets sell – and what marketers want people 
to buy – often ends up changing our consumption habits and our lifestyles, sometimes for 
the better, sometimes at a dear cost (Hastings, 2013; Kasser, 2002). The way social media 
have changed how people relate to one another, what they expect from one another 
(Graham, 2016), or how we present ourselves and narrate our lives to others (Replogle, 
2014) is not just a technological change or a sociological issue. It has become so important 
because first and foremost there were tremendous business opportunities (for which one 
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might read ‘profit-making opportunities’) attached to social media, and many companies 
have seized these opportunities to drastically change habits, norms and values under the 
guise of greater freedom and more effective communication tools. Hidden advertising in 
sponsored educational programmes, the harnessing of data under the guise of information 
and better customisation of products and services, the emotional manipulation of attachment 
needs through the promise of joining a like-minded community have all been significantly 
helped by the spread of digital media. Hastings (2013, p.94) points out the cynicism of such 
techniques and discourses through the example of the expertly branded drinks company 
Innocent, which invites ‘you’ the customer to join the family and help make the company one 
which you are a significant part of through signing up for newsletters and giving extensive 
feedback and data about your lifestyle; once the marketing veil is removed, this invitation 
can be read as: ‘we want to get as much information about you as possible so that we can 
sell more of our products than ever, but we are going to be all cutesy and hick because that 
way you might forget we are a rapacious corporation. Indeed that we are part of the Coca-
Cola Corporation’ (ibid).  
 
Are we happier now? Perhaps, although probably not; Schumaker (2016) indeed outlines the 
widespread demoralisation that infects the cultural foundations of our communities. Have 
social and moral norms of expression and of behaviour been affected by the rise of social 
media and the incredible spread of mobile technology? Definitely yes. This is not always 
perceived as a problem, for it is argued that customers would not embrace a product or a 
service if they did not actually want this product or that service. Rejecting accusations of 
manipulating markets, business claims that it offers innovation, progress, prosperity, welfare 
and that customers are the ones who have the last word. Yet it is no secret that wants and 
needs are manufactured, and that the growth of an economy is not left to the hands of 
supposedly discerning customers but is determined by the (short-term) interests of 
conglomerate corporations (Grey, 2013; Hastings, 2013; Klein, 2000). The raging yet 
complex controversy over the opaque Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
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(TTIP) agreement demonstrates the power of ‘corporate overlords’ by means of intense 
lobbying, and the influence they possess (and aim to expand further) on the political and 
social spheres (Coltrane, 2016a; 2016b). Business thus occupies a central place in an 
economy and in society, but the awareness we have of its actual scope of influence is likely 
small. This suggests a significant power lies in the shadow of the collective psyche, 
illustrated by the abuse of business against other spheres of human life.  
 
The rise of business ethics as a distinct conversational field, dated from anywhere between 
the 1920s (notably with the rise of the ‘human relations’ movement and the discovery of the 
‘emotional worker’ – Hollway, 1991) to the 1960s (stimulated by the civil rights movement 
and the beginnings of environmental activism), could suggest an attempt to bring to 
consciousness the pervasive influence of business and the impact of business values on 
non-business affairs. To this date, however, there remains much work to be done to develop 
business ethics as a core conversational field. Still a somewhat controversial or derided 
concept, business ethics has so far not proved able to question the place of business in 
society, thereby leaving significant complexes unexamined in the collective psyche. The 
power imbalance, the unsustainable rhetoric of constant growth, the cynical discourse 
praising the ever-increasing wealth gap as beneficial for everybody: all point towards an 
unhealthy psyche, not merely a depressed one. We witness far too many recurring cases of 
‘conscious corruption’ and ‘perverse dynamics’ in those organisations that set the tone for 
our work-life and, more generally, for much of our social and personal life (Long, 2008, p. 2). 
This overwhelming shadow of business in the collective psyche undoubtedly resonates 
within the psyche of individuals (Jackall’s 1988 oft-quoted enquiry into managerial ethics 
illustrates this well) though we are left with few tools to adequately comprehend this 
phenomenon.  
 
One of Jung’s major contributions to our understanding of human behaviour was to 
recognise that the psyche could not be approached rationally; instead we had to be more 
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creative, more imaginative to engage with it, to grasp its language. Denhardt (1981, p. 36) 
echoed Jung’s position when he declared that ‘…in an effort to serve our own purposes…we 
no longer experience the world in its fullness, but only in the stagnant categories provided by 
our organizations and other institutions’. It therefore seems appropriate to turn to analytical 
psychology to reconsider the moral content of business and its ethical implications on 
individuals and the communities they live in. Work organisations are especially relevant 
communities to explore as they are the playing field for business relations between multiple 
stakeholders. Furthermore, work is an activity of socio-economic and psycho-emotional 
importance which contributes to the formation of one’s conscious identity (Moore, 1992). The 
workplace, that is the organisation in which work takes place and which is itself structured 
around some business principles (at minimum, trading work for pay), is a major source of 
moral tension and dilemmas that need to be explored. Starting from this context, I will 
expose how Jung’s understanding of the psyche not only helps to identify and explain such 
moral tension, but also offers very practical insights to address the tension and integrate it.  
 
Jung’s framework to understand ethical issues 
Proulx’s review (1994) of Jung’s views on ethics is one of the few papers that have explored 
this specific aspect of analytical psychology. Although much has been written on ethical 
standards and guidelines in the consulting room (e.g. Allphin, 2005; Solomon, 2000; 2001), 
very few authors have systematically engaged with Jung’s contribution to ethics. Neumann’s 
seminal work on the new ethic (1969/1990) brought forth by a more conscious grasp of the 
depths of the psyche, is helpful to contextualise Jung’s own writings on the matter, and to 
appreciate the moral relevance of analytical psychology as practice and process. Samuels 
(1989) has also offered his own interpretation of the moral question, which I will discuss in a 
later section, although he did shy away from Jung’s specific terminology. Nonetheless, 
despite the fact that many acknowledge the ethical undertone of Jung’s proposals, it is often 
argued that he ‘did not write much explicitly on the subject’ and that to some extent ‘Jung’s 
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analysis does not do justice to the rich diversity and vividness of moral problems in daily life’ 
(Proulx, 1994, pp. 102; 117).  
 
I would challenge this position. I believe Jung wrote very explicitly on the practical aspects of 
ethical dilemmas in more papers than is usually noted. Civilization in transition (1970, CW10) 
is in fact a rich volume that includes several essays tackling the question of ethics in a so-
called modern society, with many of these essays written in Jung’s later years: beyond the 
obvious texts ‘A psychological view of conscience’ (1958) and ‘Good and evil in analytical 
psychology’ (1959), one should also consult ‘The fight with the shadow’ (1946), the earlier 
essay ‘The spiritual problem of modern man’ (1931), and most importantly ‘The 
undiscovered self’ (1957). Other relevant writings worth mentioning include ‘Crime and the 
soul’ (1932/1977, CW18), ‘The transcendent function’ (1958/1969b, CW8), Aion’s sections 
on the shadow and the self (1969a, CW9ii), ‘The development of personality’ (1934/1954, 
CW17) and much of Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1963/1995).   
 
I would summarise Jung’s contribution to the ethical debate in the following terms: he 
understood that individual moral agency is complex and fragile, and needs to be consciously 
nurtured: this is the meaning and value of inner work. I argue that Jung provided us with a 
more thorough understanding and appreciation of the challenge of being an individual moral 
agent living in an im/moral collective. The experience of being a conscious individual in a 
collective of beings is, in fact, one of the most significant sources of moral tension. It is 
particularly evident in the workplace, or in the context of our relationships with the groups 
and communities we associate with. To further unpack the content and experience of those 
moral tensions, I will delineate below what I believe is Jung’s framework to helps us 
understand ethical issues.  
 
Moral tension can manifest in different forms, which either involve some degree of projection 
or inflation, or reflect a conflict between the two kinds of conscience discussed by Jung (see 
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Table 1). In the former category, moral tension can be related to the persona, whereby the 
ego falls into a role-identification and loses track of other aspects of the personality. The 
need to present oneself in a bright light, to hide the darkness, to be the best, overtakes every 
other concerns; the ego becomes uni-dimensionally identified with a pre-defined (collective) 
persona, seemingly obliterating the depths of the self (Rozuel, 2010). Tensions can also 
reflect an ego-inflation of some sort, leading to narcissistic, Machiavellian or sociopathic 
behaviours that normalise manipulation, trickery and instrumentalisation of others. Another 
variation of such moral tension consists in shadow projection (counterpart to the persona), 
through which the external ‘other’ is made to carry the rejected, the unacceptable. This also 
enables the ego to avoid responsibility for the perpetuation of hurtful or evil actions.  
 
The other broad category of moral tension includes what Jung called ‘conflict of duty’. In 
simplified terms, the tension here emerges from the perceived contradiction between the 
norms of social conformity and the desire to pursue one’s own creative intuition. The moral 
consequences of an unresolved conflict of duty lead to a tendency to blindly follow the herd 
(or being ‘one of the million zeros’ as Jung eloquently puts it – 1957/1970, para. 535) even 
when this path is destructive. I will further develop how each of these aspects is considered 
by Jung, and illustrate their significance in relation to business and work organisations. Of 
course, this categorisation has its limits because the actual experience of moral tension is 
frequently less clear-cut than portrayed here. Nonetheless, a better understanding of the 
various dynamics at play enables the ego to recognise more effectively the nature of the 









Table 1. Overview of moral tension and its manifestations 
 
 
Projection/Inflation Conflict of Duty 
Articulated through… Persona/Shadow Moral and Ethical Conscience 
Manifested as… Repression  
 Rejection Breakdown and Burn-out 
 Hubris Isolation (lone voice) 
 Violence  
(moral, psychological, physical) 
Fear 
Some Responses and  Compartmentalisation Corruption and compromise 
Modes of Coping Scapegoating Whistleblowing 
 
 
Projection, inflation and compartmentalisation 
I shall start with discussing the shadow as the most noticeable moral hurdle in one’s psyche. 
In Aion (1969a, paras. 14-16, original emphasis), Jung thus outlines the moral tension 
created by shadow projection:  
The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality… [To 
become conscious of dark aspects of the personality] is the essential condition for 
any kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable 
resistance. …These resistances are usually bound up with projections, which are not 
recognized as such, and their recognition is a moral achievement beyond the 
ordinary. 
The shadow is the repository of the repressed, but, more so, it captures the otherness in 
ourselves. The rejection of the internal other parallels the rejection of the external other, and 
leads to a heightened intolerance for alterity (Kafka’s short-story The metamorphosis offers a 
classic illustration of this behaviour – see e.g. Rozuel, 2014 for its socio-economic 
significance). Instances of scapegoating, discrimination or stigmatisation are traces of 
shadow projection, which can lead to extreme forms of violence expressed morally, 
psychologically or physically. This behaviour signals an unconscious fantasy of perfection 
which sets the bar for normalcy; yet perfection is not only illusory but very much subjective 
too. What is perfect for one is imperfect for someone else. That said, collective values play a 
part in setting the bar on what is normal and what is perfect, so that the individual ego may 
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feel the need to reject or repress what it would have spontaneously or intuitively found 
normal or ‘perfect’ on its own. The fear of inadequacy and, subsequently, the fear of being 
alienated from the group, further triggers a need to project one’s shadow onto an external 
other. Until the ego accepts responsibility for the shadow, projections will pave the way for 
harmful behaviour and intolerance. Jung made this point very clear (1957/1970, para. 577): 
‘Nothing has a more divisive and alienating effect upon society than this moral complacency 
and lack of responsibility, and nothing promotes understanding and rapprochement more 
than the mutual withdrawal of projections.’ Johnson (1991, p. 27) concurs: ‘The tendency to 
see one’s shadow ‘out there’ in one’s neighbor or in another race or culture is the most 
dangerous aspect of the modern psyche.’  
 
While the moral significance of shadow projection expands far beyond the realm of 
business1, many examples of shadow projection can be drawn from the workplace, and their 
cost is high in terms of moral decency and human dignity. On the market front, marketers 
have a fair share of responsibility in imposing a quest for perfection and differentiation that is 
often based more on mere perception than on the actual content of products or quality of 
services (see for example Spurgin’s interesting discussion of ‘real’ compared with ‘perfect’ 
images in advertising, 2003). Within the human resource department, gender discrimination 
remains high despite policies purported to tackle the issue and apparent goodwill from 
employers and politicians (Kirchmeyer, 2002). Other forms of rejection of otherness (on 
disabilities, race, education, weight…) are all too common, even more so at the top 
management levels where strategic decisions are made. It is not that this is a new 
                                                          
1 Zweig and Abrams (1991, p.xx) poignantly depict the collective shadow as follows: ‘The collective shadow – 
human evil – is staring back at us virtually everywhere: It shouts from newsstand headlines; it wanders our 
streets, sleeping in doorways, homeless; it squats in X-rated neon-lit shops on the peripheries of our cities; it 
embezzles our monies from the local savings and loan; it corrupts power-hungry politicians and perverts our 
systems of justice; it drives invading armies through dense jungles and across desert sands; it sells arms to mad 
dealers and gives the profits to reactionary insurgents; it pours pollution through hidden pipes into our rivers 
and oceans, and poisons food with invisible pesticides….This may help explain why we are riveted to vio lent 
news stories of warmongers and religious fanatics. Repelled yet drawn to the violence and chaos of our world, 




phenomenon. Rather, the problem is that shadow projection endures and the ‘others’ 
continue to be denied basic moral rights. Jung wisely said that: ‘Recognition of the 
shadow…leads to the modesty we need in order to acknowledge imperfection’ (1957/1970, 
para. 579). A good starting point to tackle the shadow is thus to come to terms with the fact 
that the human community is made up of individuals who need the support of one another 
because we are imperfect. The business rhetoric of winners and losers, of being the best, of 
ultimate challenge and ever-so-perfect images in fact encourages shadow projection – by 
implying that those who fail are not worthy of their humanness. More modesty is indeed what 
we need, but modesty grounded in a deeper sense of our own worth as imperfect and 
singular human beings.  
 
Modesty is also a suitable remedy for ego-inflation when it loses its creative quality. By ego-
inflation, I here refer to cases where the ego becomes quasi-identified with an archetype 
(likely in its complex form), so much so that the ego believes it is omnipotent. Some of the 
risks associated with a long-lasting inflation include the loss of connection with one’s 
humanity, notwithstanding the fact that the ego may be so consumed by the archetypal 
image that it cannot return to a normal state of consciousness thereafter. Instances of ego-
inflation are widespread in the business world, often manifested through a fascination with 
‘heroes’ (the captains of industry or the CEOs with a magical touch) whom everyone aspires 
to resemble and moulds one’s behaviour upon, as well as a tendency to dominate discourse 
(Matthews, 2002) and control the game. The story of the bank Lehman Brothers, which 
epitomises the 2008 financial crisis, is a perfect example of inflation becoming normalised 
and institutionalised (the BBC documentary The fall of Lehman Brothers offers a thorough 
analysis of the case). Many of the recent large-scale bankruptcies (Enron, WorldCom) or 
hefty corporate fines (BP for pollution, Royal Bank of Scotland for several dodgy practices, 
Amazon or Starbucks for tax evasion) due to immoral practices and to what commentators 
sum up as ‘hubris’ (Stein, 2013), portray senior managers with a characteristic ego-inflation, 
which did not seem to them abnormal because it appeared in line with the norms of 
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business. Furthermore, business norms reward excess in the form of bonuses and 
compensation packages that reinforce the gap between reality and phantasm, whereby an 
employee aspires to be the special one and feels they deserve what they are paid. A recent 
report outlined how on average a CEO in large publicly-listed firms earns 204 times the 
median worker pay, although this ratio can easily reach the thousands in some cases 
(Chamberlain, 2015).  
 
Cases where the ego identifies with the persona is another variation of individuality yielding 
to the collective. Jung described the persona as ‘a mask of the collective psyche. 
Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and 
society as to what a man should appear to be’ (Jung, 1966, para. 246). Although the 
persona plays a necessary role in preserving one’s identity in different, sometimes 
challenging milieus, there also are instances whereby the persona is given far too much 
power and the mask overshadows the more complex self in the eyes of the conscious ego. 
This, again, is particularly well illustrated in business, where competition is a virtue, and 
judgements can be ruthless. The pervasive rhetoric of perfection suggests that there is no 
place for actual weakness. Some flaws can be rephrased as strengths, but only if they were 
not actual flaws in the first place, according to prevailing norms. In order to fit in, to be 
accepted, to achieve one’s goals, the persona becomes essential. We obsess about being 
the person that we are supposed to be, shutting off what we feel we actually are.  
 
The pressure can be voluntary (i.e. I want to fit in and be successful within this organisation) 
or imposed by the environment (i.e. I have no choice but to embrace the values of this 
organisation if I want to survive/keep my job). The expectations set out in work roles also 
affect our behaviour and the presentation of the (social) self, slowly numbing the holistic 
nature of the moral self. That phenomenon of compartmentalisation itself carries strong 
moral risks, as I will explain below. The lack of moral grounding in a whole self especially 
challenges our ability to feel responsible for our actions. Jung stressed that ‘every man is, in 
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a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man when he is in society than when acting alone; 
for he is carried by society and to that extent relieved of his individual responsibility’ 
(1957/1970, para. 240).  
 
Studies or tales of moral exemplars (e.g. Colby and Damon, 1992; Press, 2012; Rochat and 
Modigliani, 2000; Rozuel, 2013; Schwartz and Comer, 2013) tend to suggest that the unity of 
self and morality supports greater consistency between moral judgement and moral action. 
When our sense of identity intrinsically carries moral values, we are more likely to 
spontaneously live according to these values even when the situation becomes strained. 
The self is a moral anchor, a moral guardian almost. Hence, when this unity of self and 
morality exists, we tend to have a greater awareness of the moral component of a situation, 
and a greater perception of our responsibility as a moral agent. We also show greater 
certainty about our actions (Colby and Damon, 1992). People who exhibit this unity usually 
state: ‘I know that I have to do something, I know what I should do, and I do it’, not out of 
external duty (for example religious beliefs) – although this can be an additional motivation – 
but primarily because they would not be themselves if they did not act according to the calls 
of their conscience. Moral exemplarity, in this purview, is a matter of psychological unity at 
least as much as a moral achievement (Rozuel, 2013). This is in line with Solomon’s view 
(2000) that, for Jung, the self possesses an innate capacity for ethical behaviour. 
 
The opposite state is summed up in the notion of compartmentalisation. This refers to a 
process of fragmentation of one’s personality for a given purpose, conscious or unconscious. 
For example, when I enact a role (be it a professional role or a social role with set 
expectations), I put aside other parts of myself that do not suit the role or fit my enactment of 
the role (see Rozuel, 2011). Although compartmentalisation has its advantages, notably 
when dealing with traumatic events, it nonetheless facilitates moral flexibility and alters the 
ability to perceive inconsistent moral behaviour as a self-betrayal. If different roles involve 
different sets of values (e.g. being competitive and impersonally ruthless in business are 
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positive values, whereas acting in such a way would not be considered so positively in a 
family or community setting), then one would shift from one mode to another and have to 
deal with the ambiguity of acting based on contradictory values. If the way we deal with such 
tension is to compartmentalise, the risk is real that we will develop a blurred sense of moral 
identity and, potentially, a greater acceptance of behaviours we would otherwise condemn if 
in a different role. In other words, when the ego-self axis is weakened by 
compartmentalisation, the ethical foundations of the psyche dwindle and the individual is 
more likely to accept the unacceptable. This phenomenon has been extensively reported in 
the world of work and management, under the label of moral muteness (Bird and Waters, 
1989) or moral blindness (Moberg, 2006; Palazzo et al., 2012). Both are significant factors in 
the pervasive process of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990; 2002) which numbs our 
sense of right and wrong to such a degree that we eventually condone immoral or inhumane 
actions.  
 
The importance of the self in moral behaviour, as well as the location of conscience and 
moral values within the self, as outlined by the studies mentioned above, validate Jung’s 
insight that the self is the moral repository and ethical centre for each individual. Of course, 
the archetypal self encompasses every aspect of the psyche – the shadow and the gold. But 
in the self lies a potential for extraordinary moral commitment which could be activated in the 
same way that we can activate moral cowardice. Besides, awareness of the moral resources 
of the self helps temper the sense of guilt that can emerge when we do not act according to 
how we feel we want to act in a given situation. Often, this guilt points towards a betrayal of 
the self, a breach of psychological integrity which also involves a breach of moral integrity. It 
becomes obvious that, for Jung, individuation is fundamentally a process of moral 
development, and that a greater understanding of the self uncovers new ethical strengths 
and pathways that enrich both the individual’s life and the community he or she lives in. This 
developmental process, however, is not straightforward, as even relying on conscience 




Conscience and conflict of duty 
Jung’s ethical approach was more carefully developed through the dual view of conscience. 
For Jung (1958/1970, para. 844), conscience exerts a transcending function, raising 
opposites to the level of consciousness. Jung reminds us that consciousness and 
conscience are etymologically related to the Latin word ‘conscientia’ meaning knowledge or 
to know with. The knowledge that it elicits, however, is twofold. Jung continues (ibid., para. 
825): ‘…conscience is a complex phenomenon consisting on the one hand in an elementary 
act of the will, or in an impulse to act for which no conscious reason can be given, and on 
the other hand in a judgment grounded on rational feeling’. The numinous quality of 
conscience is evident when Jung refers to it as an ‘autonomous psychic factor’ and as ‘a 
demand that asserts itself in spite of the subject’ (ibid., para. 842). But conscience is also 
fundamentally and necessarily paradoxical. It is both the Vox Dei (the voice of God) as the 
guiding daemon (or the ‘genius, guardian angel, better self, heart, inner voice, the inner and 
higher man’), and the more dangerous ‘devil, seducer, tempter, evil spirit’ (ibid., para. 843). 
Conscience thus does not guarantee moral purity, but confronts us with the inevitable 
ambivalence of human nature and consciousness itself. As Jung (ibid.) concluded: 
‘Everyone who examines his conscience is confronted with this fact, and he must admit that 
the good exceeds the bad only by a very little’. That is why a conflict of duty is often 
associated with a sense of being stuck, of being alone faced with an impossible conundrum 
whose solution will mark one for life. The tension is such that, left unattended or unresolved, 
one can suffer burn-out or fall into a state of depression, as one is caught between two major 
forces in the psyche: the unique demands of the self on the one hand, the attachment to the 
nurturing collective on the other hand.  
 
Jung interestingly stated that conscience is subject to unconscious influence, as if an 
unconscious personality performs ‘the act of conscience’ in place of the conscious ego (ibid., 
para. 829), paradoxically shaking the ego’s confidence whilst enabling it to further develop 
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and individuate (1934/1954). As a psychic reaction, conscience is moral when it stirs the ego 
towards the mores or the moral codes (thus implicitly suggesting conformity with collective 
norms). Conscience becomes ethical when the decision is reflective and inspired by ‘the 
creative power of the ethos that expresses the whole man’ and flows from both 
consciousness and the irrational unconscious (1958/1970, para. 855).  
 
This confirms that inner work to develop consciousness has a strong moral dimension, for it 
is through greater ego consciousness that we can understand and work with (or work 
through) the primitive and paradoxical form of conscience originating from the unconscious. 
It is a hazardous exercise to distinguish the ‘right kind of conscience’ from the ‘wrong one’, 
when the latter ‘exaggerates, perverts, and twists evil into good and good into evil just as our 
own scruples do; and it does so with the same compulsiveness and with the same emotional 
consequences as the ‘right’ kind of conscience’ (ibid., para. 835). From a moral perspective, 
it is therefore absolutely essential to recognise the paradox and sustain consciousness of 
the possible ambiguity of our motives:  
No one can guarantee that he has only noble motives. We know – some of us – far 
too much about ourselves to pretend that we are one hundred per cent good and not 
egotists to the marrow. Always behind what we imagine are our best deeds stands 
the devil, patting us paternally on the shoulder and whispering, ‘Well done!’ (ibid., 
para. 837) 
Nonetheless, when a decision must be made, the moral challenge is to take a chance on the 
self, without being sure of what the self exactly wants, nor whether the whisper comes from 
the right or the wrong kind of conscience. Integrity here means commitment to the self, the 
archetypal centre that makes each unique and one (Beebe, 1992). In the self lies 
conscience, both of the right and the wrong kind, which informs what we can and should do 
irrelevant of what society might consider is right. To ignore the call of the self infers both a 




One of the main objections to Jung’s apparent slip towards unwarranted subjectivism 
(Proulx, 1994, p. 118) is that such a statement seems to discard the moral value of socially 
prevalent, collective codes and norms. However, Jung merely outlines how, despite the 
practical wisdom of external codes and norms, which over time have helped regulate human 
behaviour in communities, the codes do not sufficiently account for the unconscious. This is 
a significant weakness in so far as the unconscious is disruptive and creative in its own 
terms, so that even our most committed conscious choices may be hijacked by unconscious 
dynamics, and the ego left shattered by the occurrence. I believe that what Jung was 
proposing was that a life lived entirely relying upon external codes and norms is not only 
illusory but dangerous; for in the self lies an ethos, unique to the individual but not 
necessarily elitist nor devoid of shared concern for humanity, that possesses even greater 
strength and authenticity than the collective mores. An excessive attachment to the mores 
can actually impede ethical behaviour if the individual then surrenders their moral 
consciousness to the collective, allowing the collective to decide what is the right thing to do. 
In Jung’s view, conflicts of duty emerge when the mores (the moral codes) fail to provide 
clear answers or possibly come into conflict with more subjective, emotional responses 
triggered by the unconscious. As hinted earlier, to face a conflict of duty is a most hazardous 
task, made even more difficult by the fear that one may become estranged or excluded from 
the safe arms of the community if one follows what one’s conscience says. Hence Jung’s 
remark that ‘…it needs unusual courage or – what amounts to the same thing – unshakable 
faith for a person simply to follow the dictates of his own conscience’ (1958/1970, para. 835).  
 
Samuels has offered an interpretation of the modern ethical attitude articulated around the 
complementary notions of original morality and moral imagination (Samuels, 1989). The 
former is depicted as a black-and-white, vertically-oriented authority regulating behaviour 
through codes and a process of differentiation through inclusion/exclusion, whilst the latter is 
defined as the more ingenious, intuitive and flexible understanding of moral principles that 
justifies exceptions and casuistry, and promotes forgiveness and moral pluralism. Samuels 
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suggests that socially-contextualised moral problems are more easily understood through 
the lens of the complementarity between the aspirational perfection of original morality, and 
the adaptability of moral imagination. His reworking of Jung’s dual view of conscience is 
interesting to the extent that he focuses on how we can morally justify exceptions to the 
rules; we can nonetheless ponder on whether such reinterpretation is necessary, as the 
dynamic of individual versus collective imperatives somehow covers – albeit in lesser details 
– what moral imagination here encapsulates.  
 
Besides, Samuels ultimately acknowledges one of Jung’s great insights: that the inner voice, 
originating in the archetypal self and warrant of moral integrity – in whichever form – is 
potentially plural in its nature (1989, p. 205). This means that universal principles of love, 
care, and compassion can co-exist with more individualised expressions of ‘goodness’, and 
that the suspicion that we will condone moral subjectivism by grounding moral integrity in the 
self is misguided. How I express goodness and moral commitment can be different from how 
my neighbour expresses goodness and moral commitment; but that does not mean that 
these two individual expressions are necessarily antagonistic, nor that the collective 
dimension of the archetypal self cannot contain shared moral values that infuse each 
individual expression of goodness. In the archetypal self is the sublime, which has no less 
weight than the fantasy of aggression in shaping human behaviour, both individually and 
collectively. What matters, though, is how we engage with the self and its prima materia – 
and that is an individual moral choice.  
 
Implications for business and work organisations 
It becomes evident that Jung’s view of moral issues can be best captured through a 
fundamental tension between the individual and the collective. Jung seems to suggest that, 
just as individuation is about coming to terms with one’s own individuality, the process of 
moral development is about navigating through collective norms and expectations (either 
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present in the external community, or internalised in the form of the moral conscience) whilst 
asserting one’s own individual ethos encapsulated in the ethical conscience and rooted in 
the self. Only greater understanding of the self can bring forth greater moral sensitivity and 
commitment, though it will never be a guaranteed route to happiness and moral heroism 
(cue the devil patting us on the shoulder). Nevertheless, it is the most promising and 
enduring way towards a greater tolerance of oneself and others, which encompasses the 
wise and humble recognition that we are not perfect and need others to be.  
 
How is this relevant to work organisations and business ethics? First and foremost, it helps 
us to comprehend more systematically the moral and psychological implications of 
organisational culture, notably business values, for individuals. It denounces the pressure 
which many workplaces put on their employees to ‘leave feelings at home’ in order to 
become an efficient performer at work, and highlights the heavy moral cost of such a stance 
(see for example Kantor and Streitfeld’s 2015 exposé of Amazon’s management practices). 
It also explains why formal codes of conduct fail to sustain good behaviour amongst staff, 
and where we could turn our attention to instead for the sake of enhancing moral awareness. 
In this respect, Wilcox’s study of three senior Human Resource managers (2012) is 
illustrative of the perversity of market capitalism and its structural logic (a narrowly defined 
cost/benefit assessment, a reward culture centred around downsizing and cost-cutting) that 
constrains behaviour by manipulating moral distress in ways that make people feel they 
have no choice but to follow the music. Wilcox (ibid., pp. 93-94) goes on suggesting that the 
possibility for ‘relational spaces’ helps negotiate these tensions with peers and nurture a 
group identity (in this case, a professional identity) even when it deviates from the demands 
of the dominant organisational culture. Having a space to meet and relate becomes a form of 
moral support and ethical resistance nurturing moral agency. In Jungian terms, this practice 
would translate into a need to establish a ritual for self-reflection and shadow work within the 




As mentioned earlier, work organisations are overwhelmingly rationally designed to pursue a 
specific (occasionally narrow) purpose, which is supported throughout by the organisational 
structure, culture, norms, roles and policies (Denhardt, 1981). In this context, personal 
relationships are regulated and instrumental, while expressions of individuality are 
discouraged for they are perceived as disruptive to the overall efficiency of the system. 
Consequently, ‘the capacity for unmediated experience, that sense of openness which 
permits the most complete growth of the individual personality are lost or at least severely 
diminished’ says Denhardt (ibid., p. 38). Even the so-called creative and innovative 
workplaces that market themselves as encouraging and nurturing towards individual ideas 
(Google being an oft-cited example, see for instance Girard’s 2009 uncritically enthusiastic 
endorsement of its business model) still control the behaviour of their staff, and only offer 
them snapshots of freedom so as to better harness their individuality to further the interests 
of the organisation. There is in fact little tolerance for non-conformity, nor for individual moral 
integrity, if it questions the underlying principles upon which the organisation is built – which 
generally include profit-making, market expansion, oligopolistic dreams and a great degree 
of opacity when it comes to the governance system. Those who do not agree are deemed 
‘unfit’, and seek a way out or are asked to leave. Here is the first source of tension between 
the individual and the collective, albeit one hardly acknowledged as a moral problem of 
social significance.  
 
Within organisations, further conflicts between the individual and some degree of collective 
patterns can be found. In principle, companies rely on a more or less formal code of ethics to 
regulate behaviour and establish a ‘clear’ boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour. Usually, such codes resonate with widely accepted values such as honesty, 
service, care, transparency and so on. Therefore, such codes permeate the moral 
conscience of the individual worker. However, codes are never comprehensive and do not 
provide guidance for every situation encountered by employees (Coughlan, 2005; Somers, 
2001). In this respect, organisational culture and the collective psyche play an important role 
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in how rules, norms and mores are interpreted and actually put into practice by 
organisational members. Furthermore, the psyche of each individual agent can influence the 
relative strength or stringency of the prevailing moral codes. The quality of leaders is a clear 
example of this process: if leaders act in a ‘do as I say and not as I do’ manner, the norms 
embedded in moral conscience will not be as easily embraced by other employees (e.g. 
Clement, 2006); by contrast, if leaders actually demonstrate consistent individual integrity in 
their behaviour, the meaningfulness of the moral code will increase amongst the staff. That 
said, possible conflicts of duty may still emerge if the moral code implemented in the 
organisation contradicts one’s individual ethical conscience.  
 
This can be particularly painful when the individual is pressurised to show loyalty to the 
common good (i.e. the organisation’s goals) even though those differ from his or her 
personal ethos. Beyond the question of power and interpersonal relationships, there arises 
an issue of self-assertion that is a psychological and moral matter. We find these dynamics 
in cases of implicit or explicit retaliation against whistle-blowers (e.g. Baird, 2014; Henik, 
2008; Near and Miceli, 1986), but also on a minor scale when we experience occasional 
ambiguity in our motives for action. This ambiguity, when left unexamined, is thrown back 
into the shadow and can manifest in subsequent situations of scapegoating or intolerance for 
otherness, experienced either internally or externally. In the former case, we turn to self-
hatred or self-rejection; in the latter case, we project our moral distress onto an external 
other who helps the ego finds relief by concretising a split. Collectively in work organisations, 
this is illustrated by a rejection of those who denounce ill-doings or blow the whistle when we 
did not dare to do so despite feeling the twinge from our ethical conscience demanding we 
do something similar.  
 
Perera (1986) indeed suggests that scapegoated individuals are somehow more sensitive to 
what is being played up in the collective unconscious, and become bearer of what the 
community refuses to acknowledge as its own dark shadow or its own shortcomings. The 
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scapegoats are perceived ‘as dangerous viewers of shadow material best left unseen. 
…Because they arouse unconscious discomfort, their perceptions may be disregarded or 
denied, while they themselves are shamed and rejected, made to feel a dis-ease 
comparable to that aroused in those they seem to see through’ (ibid., p. 35). When the ego 
of an individual or of a collective of individuals (e.g. a work group) does not face its own 
moral ambivalence and therefore its own failings, the psychic energy is thrown back into the 
unconscious but resurfaces through a scapegoat who, by denouncing this very same 
shadow material, symbolises a need for purgation (Perera, ibid.). However, as our modern 
world lacks a developed consciousness of this symbolic process, the scapegoat pays the 
price: be it through bullying, harassment, unfair dismissal, slandering, suicide or death, the 
shadow expresses itself concretely, yet not in a creative manner; indeed, the scapegoated 
individual becomes identified with a victim archetype, and the community carries on 
identifying itself as good and righteous.  
 
Clinical and work psychologist Pezé (2008, pp. 33-44) tells the story of Mr B, diagnosed with 
depression due to persecutions by his work colleagues. This offers a relevant example of the 
cost of ‘being the first who tells the truth’: Mr B experienced a deep moral unrest (a conflict of 
duty) when he witnessed his colleagues misbehaving at work, a work that itself was morally 
and emotionally taxing (working in a cemetery) and which led his colleagues to drinking 
during work shifts and stealing personal items from the bodies as a form of coping – hugely 
inappropriately – with the stress. Mr B’s refusal to adopt the norms endorsed by his peers 
and his decision to report the misbehaviour to his supervisor led him to be quickly bullied 
and scapegoated; yet, he effectively listened to his ethical conscience (values of honesty, of 
respectful work, of dignity and integrity) when the moral conscience might have been more 
ready to compromise or find a middle-ground. The story, though, also signals an important 
collective problem, as Pezé notes (ibid): that the work itself, and relatedly the working 
conditions are inherently a cause of suffering that remains unrecognised and thus sent back 
into the shadow. Inasmuch as the misbehaviour of Mr B’s colleagues was morally 
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condemnable, it was also symptomatic of a deep suffering at work that work organisations 
are at best ill-equipped to address, at worst blind to.  
 
Work organisations therefore provide a fertile ground for experiencing conflicts of duty, and 
individuals are usually neither encouraged nor supported in using the creative power of the 
transcendent function to solve the conflict or tension. Instead, the pervasiveness of business 
values that further encourage split and competition, and have little patience for the disorder 
and ambivalence that accompanies the process of individuation, make conscious moral 
development even more arduous. And yet, we need to pay much more attention to the 
psyche’s dynamics in the workplace and in the business arena, for that is where our soul 
lives and grows for a fair chunk of adulthood. The context (workplace) and content (job) of 
work intertwine with individual psychological growth: ‘an employee who feels fulfilled offers 
more to the work environment; the fulfilling workplace offers the individual more’ (Auger and 
Arneberg, 1992, p. 40). In contrast, when the soul’s demands are ignored, destructive 
behaviours emerge as an expression of the shadow, or as a clumsy attempt from the naïve 
ego to consciously solve the tension. From what I have discussed, a fulfilling organisation is 
one that supports and values the growth of the individual. It is one that does not 
unconsciously and uncritically embrace business values. It is one that remembers it is a 
vessel for complex, messy, ambiguous, small but occasionally sublime human lives. Life is 
not a business competition, and should not be reduced to a market value (Sandel, 2012). 
Organisational development would do well to account for the needs of individuals to develop 
individually within a collective, even when this is more disruptive than it would like. Basic 
steps would include: searching for projections and stories that carry patterns of the 
organisation’s psyche; accepting that transformation and change are a normal process 
better experienced when we engage with it consciously and willingly; working through 
‘shadow stuff’ which manifest through power games, resentment, rivalries, or the mere 
stiffness of practices and policies; and promoting integration and inclusion rather than 
compartmentalisation amongst staff, including greater consideration of stakeholders’ 
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experiences. The language of the psyche is neither well-known nor welcome in the corporate 
world; yet it is a language that speaks to all organisational actors as individuals and as 
members of a living community. It enables us to uncover what lies beneath and beyond the 
roles and the artefacts that make up our material world; it tells us that the very fact that we 
are ‘irregular phenomena’ and statistical anomalies is precisely what makes our moral 
greatness (Jung, 1957/1970, paras. 494-504); it sheds light onto darkness, connects 
suffering to meaning and gives us the impetus to discover what we are made of. As an 




I mentioned at the start of the paper that Jung’s ethical perspective is hopeful. The lesson 
we can draw from his writings is that even when caught in a mob, there is always somehow 
a conscious individual choice and a possibility for consciousness to grow. The flipside of this 
is that it takes work to become aware of this choice, and faith or courage to embrace this 
choice. Jung made it very clear that social (and moral) progress cannot happen in society if it 
does not happen within each individual member of that society. This applies to business as a 
community, as well as to work organisations. We cannot expect significant improvements in 
the ethics of business if individual business agents fail to attend to their own psyche to start 
with. As Jung said: ‘It is, unfortunately, only too clear that if the individual is not truly 
regenerated in spirit, society cannot be either, for society is the sum total of individuals in 
need of redemption’ (1957/1970, para. 536). He most eloquently developed this comment in 
Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1963/1995, p. 362): 
As a rule…the individual is so unconscious that he altogether fails to see his own 
potentialities for decision. Instead he is constantly and anxiously looking around for 
external rules and regulations which can guide him in his perplexity. …Every effort is 
made to teach idealistic beliefs or conduct which people know in their hearts they can 
26 
 
never live up to, and such ideals are preached by officials who know that they 
themselves have never lived up to these high standards and never will. What is 
more, nobody ever questions the value of this kind of teaching. Therefore the 
individual who wishes to have an answer to the problem of evil, as it is posed today 
has need, first and foremost, of self-knowledge, that is, the utmost possible 
knowledge of his own wholeness. He must know relentlessly how much good he can 
do, and what crimes he is capable of, and must beware of regarding the one as real 
and the other as illusion. Both are elements within his nature, and both are bound to 
come to light in him, should he wish – as he ought – to live without self-deception or 
self-illusion. 
 
No doubt the task is frightening, and no doubt there are further hurdles along the way. No 
doubt we may prefer to flee from this challenge and tell ourselves we are content as we are, 
or that the cause is already lost because the task is impossible to achieve. Yet, turning to 
Jung again, I put my faith in the belief that even when we seem to see only violence, 
exploitation, corruption and despair in ourselves and in our communities, the good is also 
already there:  
…as the conscious mind can put the question, ‘Why is there this frightful conflict 
between good and evil?’ so the unconscious can reply, ‘Look closer! Each needs the 
other. The best, just because it is the best, holds the seed of evil, and there is 
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